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Child labor has persisted as a topical phenomenon for centuries. It existed 
during Industrial Revolution and continues to exist even today in many parts of the 
world. Child labor not only ‘deprives children of their childhood, their potential and 
their dignity, but also afflicts them both physically and mentally’ (International Labor 
Organization (ILO), 2004). Although there is a variation in the minimum age for 
admission to employment and work from country to country, the ILO convention No. 
138 has set 15 as the basic minimum age for children to be employed for market wage 
(ILO, 2004). An estimated 16 percent of 5-14 year-old children are economically 
active around the world. The incidence of child labor is very high in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the child-labor participation rate is 29 percent (ILO, 2004). The rates 
are 19 percent and 16 percent in Asia and Pacific and Latin America respectively 
(ILO, 2004). But since 1950, the trend has been declining worldwide. The decline is 
more notable in Asia than in Latin America (Basu, 1999). Nevertheless, child labor 
continues to exist and is a burning issue in many poor and developing nations around 
the world.  
Researchers and economists have argued that one way to eliminate child labor 
is through the alleviation of poverty in developing nations. The International Program 
on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) identifies microfinance as an effective 
means to combat child labor (Doorn and Churchill, 2004). Microfinance has been an 
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innovative approach in alleviating poverty both at the household level and at the 
village level (Pitt and Khandker, 1998 and Khandker, 2005). It provides both savings 
and collateral free group-based credit lending at small scale and medium scale to poor 
rural households. In Bangladesh and in other parts of the world, ‘microfinance 
operations support mainly the poor and women engaged in informal activities’ 
(Khandker, 2005). A microfinance organization such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
provides production credit to self-selected groups of five. The bank monitors 
borrower’s activity and maintains a peer pressure among members of the self-formed 
group for the timely repayment of loans. A loan default by a group member will result 
into the whole group’s ineligibility for future loans (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). The 
average loan size by Grameen Bank is around $100.1 The Grameen Bank has served 
over 7 million borrowers out of which 97 percent were women, and the loan recovery 
rate for Grameen Bank is approximately 98 percent.2  Given the relative success of 
microfinance in poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment, an important but 
under investigated question is if microfinance has a positive impact on child’s 
welfare. Using data from rural Bangladesh, Pitt and Khandker (1998) show that an 
‘annual household consumption expenditure increases 18 taka for every 100 
additional taka borrowed by women from Grameen Bank and two other microcredit 
programs, compared with 11 taka for men’ (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
1For details visit http://www.gdrc.org/icm/grameen-supportgrp.html. Based on 2009 exchange rate, one
USD is equivalent to 69.055 taka (taka is the currency of Bangladesh)
2For details visit http://www.grameeninfo.org/
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Similarly, Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright (2003) show that ‘microcredit program 
participation leads to women taking a greater role in household decision making, 
having greater access to financial and economic resources, having greater social 
networks, having greater bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands, and having 
greater freedom of mobility’ (Pitt et al., 2003). In yet another study, using the same 
data set from rural Bangladesh, Pitt, Khandker, Chowdhury, and Millimet (2003) 
show that ‘a 10 percent increase in microcredit provided to females increases the arm 
circumference of their daughters by 6.3 percent, twice the increase that would be 
expected from a similar proportionate increase in credit provided to men’ (Pitt et al., 
2003). Such findings support the claim that microcredit positively impacts child’s 
welfare, thus enhancing child schooling and reducing child labor via income 
generation and risk management.
But despite such claims and some theoretical analysis, development 
practitioners know little about the impact of microfinance upon child labor. This is 
mainly due to paucity of research and ambiguities presented so far on impact analysis. 
Edmonds (2007) writes that many early studies of child labor used cross-country data 
from the ILO’s LABORSTA database. This database does not have information on 
hours worked by children within the household (Edmonds, 2007). As such, earlier 
child labor analyses based on this database have generally understated the extent of 
child labor (Edmonds, 2007). Hazarika and Sarangi’s (2005) empirical study on 
household access to microcredit and child labor is based on a survey analysis in 
which children do not work outside household for market wage (Hazarika and 
Sarangi, 2005). But the reality is such that in many rural areas of the developing 
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world, poor children labor outside household for market wage. Moreover, Hazarika 
and Sarangi’s (2005) empirical study on household access to microcredit and child 
labor suffers from time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, thus biasing the 
estimation results (Hazarika and Sarangi, 2005). 
This paper aims to shed light on the impact of microfinance loans upon child 
labor using household-level panel data for rural Bangladesh. I first present the OLS 
regression estimates using cross-sectional data. I then extend my empirical analysis 
using household-level fixed effect in panel data to assess the actual impact of 
microcredit on child labor. 
The relationship between household access to credit and child labor has been 
studied, analyzed, and approached with different perspectives by economists. Ranjan 
(1999) argues that poverty coupled with credit constraints can give rise to child labor 
in developing nations. She further shows that ‘policies such as a child labor ban will 
further aggravate the welfare of the households intending to send their children to 
work and hence suggests some alternative policies’ (Ranjan, 1999). Baland and 
Robinson (2000) study the implications of child labor on household’s welfare level. 
They argue that child labor negatively impacts the accumulation of human capital. 
Child labor is inefficient when parents bestow negative bequests upon children or use 
them as a substitute for borrowing (Baland and Robinson 2000). Using panel data 
from Tanzania, Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006) study the relationship between 
household income shocks, access to credit, and child labor. They find that child labor 
significantly increases in households faced with income shocks such as crop loss.
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However, households that have an access to credit are reluctant to resort to child labor 
to cope with income shocks.3
In yet another research, using panel data from Vietnam and an instrumental 
variable strategy, Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2005) evaluate the causal effects of 
child labor on education, health, and wages. They find that child labor negatively 
impacts school enrolment. Consequently, children suffer from income loss due to 
reduced education in their adulthood. Such loss cannot be fully offset by increased 
labor market experience as a child (Beegle et al., 2005). Hence, the authors put 
forward two implications to mitigate child labor. First, the households need to have 
an access to credit. Second, the households need to be forward looking.4
Using data from poor rural households in Bolivia, Maldonado and Gonzalez-
Vega (2008) study the impact of microfinance on schooling. They examine 
‘differences in schooling gap between households that have had access to the 
microfinance institutions for some time versus households that recently joined the 
program’ (Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega, 2008). Their empirical analysis shows 
that children from households that have joined microfinance institutions for more 
than a year have about half a year less schooling gap compared with children from 
households that have recently joined microfinance institutions (Maldonado and 
Gonzalez-Vega, 2008). 
3Emergency loans can act as buffer to the poor and needy households in dire situations such as income 
shocks.
4Households should realize the importance of educating their children today. They need to recognize 
that the returns to education are much higher.
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Using data from rural Malawi, Hazarika and Sarangi (2005) analyze the 
impact of household access to microcredit upon child work. Their survey analysis 
‘query respondents over 17 years of age about the maximum amount they might 
conceivably have borrowed’ (Hazarika and Sarangi, 2005). Contrary to popular belief 
that microcredit positively impacts child’s welfare, their empirical analysis shows that 
an access to microcredit enhances the probability of child work during peak season of 
the year (Hazarika and Sarangi, 2005).  
Although Hazarika and Sarangi’s paper is closely related to this paper’s 
subject matter, there are at least three major differences between their work and mine.
First, their empirical findings are based upon a cross-sectional data analysis for rural 
Malawi, whereas this paper’s findings are based upon a household-level panel data 
analysis for rural Bangladesh. Second, their study focuses child work by 7-11 year-
old members of the household, whereas this paper analyzes the child work by 10-15 
year-old members of the household. Most importantly, the children in their survey 
analysis do not work outside household for market wage, whereas the survey analysis 
for Bangladesh has children engaged in both within and outside household work. 
Their analysis finds significant result between household access to microcredit and 
child work only for peak season, whereas this paper examines the impact of 
microcredit on child work for the combined seasons, i.e. not excluding any season of 
the year in empirical analysis.
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II: Theoretical Motivation
While empirical findings show that there is a negative relationship between an 
access to credit and child labor, Wydick (1999), on the other hand, argues that the 
relationship can be positive if household capitalization effect dampens family-labor 
substitution effect. He writes that an increased access to credit enhances the income 
generating activities of the family. With a boost in the household-level income, the 
family enjoys more leisure. Subsequently, the family withdraws children from 
household work and hires outside laborers, thus inducing a negative impact upon 
child labor. This is the family-labor substitution effect. However, this effect can be 
seriously negated due to increased ‘marginal productivity of family labor as the 
household enterprise becomes heavily capitalized’ (Wydick, 1999). This in turn raises 
the opportunity cost of schooling. Consequently, the family’s investment in schooling 
decreases and children engage themselves either in farm or non-farm household 
enterprises. This is the household capitalization effect. 
Wydick (1999) proposes a two-period household model of child-schooling 
investment decision. Wydick (1999) writes that in the first period, the household 
owns either a farm enterprise or a non-farm enterprise such as a light manufacturing 
business. This business may possibly include the labor supply of household’s 
children. In the second period, the family retires and the business no longer exists. 
The family subsequently relies on the income of children as they become adults 
(Wydick, 1999). He assumes that the family maximizes the utility of income, Y1 and 
Y2 in the first and the second periods respectively.
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Wydick (1999) further assumes that the family divides the time endowment of 
its children between schooling h and family labor (1-h). The family business faces a 
working capital constraint given by .   represents the return to schooling realized 
in the second period and  (.) is ‘the production function that is increasing, twice 
differentiable and concave in all three inputs’ (Wydick, 1999). Wydick sets up a 
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(Source: Wydick (1999))
Note: Some notations used in above equations are different from Wydick’s (1999) paper.
Wydick writes that the ‘magnitude of the family-labor substitution effect is 
influenced by the value of 32 , which is the substitutability of hired labor for family 
labor’ (Wydick, 1999). The consequence of the household-enterprise-capitalization 
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effect is represented by 31 , which measures the extent of child labor productivity as 
the household enterprise becomes heavily capitalized (Wydick, 1999).
Hence, following Wydick’s theoretical analysis, one can argue that the overall 
impact of household access to credit on child labor depends upon the net magnitude 
of labor substitution effect and household capitalization effect. I explore the impact of 
microcredit upon child work analyzing both the magnitude of labor substitution effect 
and the household capitalization effect. 
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III: Econometric Modeling 
Previous studies on relationship between microfinance and outcomes of 
interest (say women’s health) have suffered from participant’s self-selection into the 
program and endogeneity of the program placement. The standard empirical strategy 
and bias that arises from such self-selection and endogeneity can be modeled as: 
ijB ij B j B ijX V                                                                                      (1) 
                                                                                        
ij ij z j z ij z ijZ X V B                                                                              (2)
(Source: Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Coleman (2000))
Note: Some notations used here are different from original papers.
ijB refers to the borrowing by the ith household living in the jth village. ijX refers to 
the household-level characteristics such as age and education of the household head. 
jV represents the village-level characteristics such as village electrification, paved 
road and so forth. ij captures the unmeasured determinants of household and village 
level characteristics that influence the borrowing by a household. ijZ  is the outcome 
of interest (say child labor). z captures the impact of borrowing on child labor  and 
ij  captures the unmeasured determinants of household and village level 
characteristics that influence the household’s consumption level. If ij and ij were 
uncorrelated, then program impact estimation on outcome of interest will be unbiased 
and consistent. But microfinance institutions such as Grameen Bank are usually 
located in areas with high level of poverty incidence (Khandker, 2005). In initiating 
such programs, nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s) and governments in 
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developing nations choose villages based on their organization and poverty level. 
Similarly, the participants may self-select in any microfinance institution based on 
unobserved traits such as entrepreneurial ability and social networking. As such, 
given the issues of self-selection and endogeneity, ij and ij  are very likely to be 
correlated and hence the program impact estimation on outcome of interest will be 
biased and inconsistent if OLS is used. 
Moffitt (1991) writes that there are three ways to deal with the correlation of
ij  and ij  (Moffitt, 1991). The first approach is the use of an instrumental variable. 
It is important to identify a set of variables that explains household-level borrowing 
but does not explain child labor outcome that is conditioned on borrowing. The 
second approach is the use of panel data set that provides observations on households 
before and after the availability of treatment for both participants and nonparticipants 
of microfinance programs. The third approach is the assumption of an error 
distribution of the outcome variable to be normally distributed (Moffitt, 1991).
Since the household survey analysis in rural Bangladesh is a two-year panel 
data set, I employ household-level fixed effect in panel data set to assess the impact 
of microcredit on child labor. The household-level fixed effect not only resolves 
household-level endogeneity but also resolves village-level endogeneity that can bias 
the program impact estimation (Khandker, 2005). Hence, this research uses 
household-level fixed effect in panel data set that controls for time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity both at the household-level and at the village-level. The 
reduced form child labor equation is given by:
( 1)ijt ijt ijt ij t ij ijtCL X B B                                                                  (3)
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CL refers to the average hours worked per month by a child in the ith household 
living in the jth village in period t. X is a vector of household, village, and group level 
characteristics such as age and gender of household head.   is a vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated.   and   measure the effects of current and past credit 
availability.   is the unmeasured determinant of child labor that is time-invariant and 
fixed within a household level. 
The 1991/92 household survey shows that the household borrowing begins 
from 1984. The 1998/99 household survey has data on loans taken since 1993 until 
1999. Since microfinance loans taken span over multiple years, it is important to 
examine which years’ loans impacted the most. As such, I break down the loans into 
three categories- past, recent, and most recent.5 Thus, the child labor equation can 
further be expressed as,
( 1)ijt ijt ijt ijt ij t ij ijtCL X RB MRB PB                                              (4)
                               
ijtRB refers to the stock of recent borrowing by the ith household living in the jth 
village in period t.  , , and   capture the effects of recent borrowing ( RB ), most
recent borrowing (MRB) and past borrowing (PB) respectively. 
5In 1991/92, the recent stock of loan comprises loans taken from 1984 to 1989, and the most recent 
stock of loan comprises loans from 1990 to 1992. The past borrowing is zero in 1991/92 as it is the 
first data point in the panel (Khandker, 2005). Similarly, in 1998/99, the recent stock of loan is the sum
of loans from 1993 to 1997, and the most recent stock of loan comprises loans from 1998 to 1999. The 
past borrowing in 1998/99 is the cumulative credit in 1991/92.
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IV: Data Description and Summary Statistics
This paper employs data from a survey jointly conducted by the Bangladesh 
Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) and the World Bank in 1991/92. The survey 
provides data primarily to analyze the impact of three major microcredit programs 
(Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and the Rural
Development-12 program of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRD)).6 It 
covers a total of 1,798 households drawn from 87 villages in 29 thanas.7  While eight 
program thanas were drawn randomly from each of those three microfinance project 
areas, five nonprogram thanas were also drawn randomly from a list of nonprogram 
thanas.8 Three villages were then selected randomly from each of those eight program 
thanas, thus resulting into 72 program villages. Similarly, three villages were selected 
randomly from each of those five nonprogram thanas, thus resulting into 15 
nonprogram villages. Consequently, the survey includes both program and 
nonprogram villages. In program villages, microfinance institutions have been 
operating for at least three years (Khandker, 2005). The survey also covers both 
eligible (targeted) and ineligible (nontargeted) households from both program and 
nonprogram villages.9
6 (For details, visit: http://go.worldbank.org/E9WWFZIXJ0).
7A thana is a sub-district consisting of villages.
 (For details, visit: http://go.worldbank.org/E9WWFZIXJ0).
8 For details, visit:http://go.worldbank.org/E9WWFZIXJ0.
9The eligibility criterion to join a microfinance program is based on landholding. Usually all three 
major credit programs-Grameen Bank, BRAC, and BRD target households that own less than half an 
acre of land.
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Among eligible households, some households join the program while others 
do not. And there are households that are excluded from program participation based 
on land based eligibility criteria. Hence, the survey design includes both control 
groups and treatment groups. 
Agriculture is the principal occupation of nearly two-thirds of Bangladeshis. 
Rice is the main cultivated crop, i.e. sowed and harvested on approximately 10
million hectares (Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)). The cropping seasons 
in Bangladesh are classified as Aman season (November-February), Boro season 
(March-June), and Aus season (July-October). During the Aman season, Aman rice is 
cultivated; during the Boro season, Boro rice, wheat, and pulses are cultivated, and 
during the Aus season, Aus rice and jute are cultivated (Zeller et al., 2001).  The 
1991/92 household survey includes data for these three cropping seasons. The BIDS 
and the World Bank revisit the survey in 1998/99. In addition to the same households, 
this survey also adds new households and hence covers a total of 2,599 households.10
The survey in both the periods provides data for child work from 10 years and above. 
In order to assess the impact of three major credit programs (Grameen Bank, BRAC, 
and BRD) on child labor, this paper’s cross-sectional data analysis include 
households that have 10-15 year-old children.11 However, the panel data analysis 
tracks households that have 10-15 year-old children in both periods. This restricts the 
sample size to 578 households in panel data analysis.  Summary statistics for cross-
sectional and panel data analyses are displayed in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
10 For details, visit:http://go.worldbank.org/E9WWFZIXJ0
11 In much child labor literature, 15 is considered as an upper bound.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (1991/92)











45.555               
(87.199)
21.698               
(57.329)




0.546    
(0.498)









12.172               
(1.704)
12.175               
(1.767)




6.338     
(1.958)
6.237                 
(2.4)
7.342            
(2.395)
6.483         
(2.223)
Number of 0-9 year-old 
members
1.623    
(1.206)
1.669                 
(1.389)
1.675                   
(1.44)
1.647         
(1.309)
Number of 10-15 year-old 
members
1.729    
(0.653)
1.698                 
(0.695)
1.833   
(0.739)
1.738         
(0.683)
Household head's age in years
43.821    
(9.58)
44.676               
(9.813)
46.369               
(11.736)
44.547       
(10.101)
Male Household head
0.947    
(0.223)
0.935                 
(0.245)
0.95           
(0.217)





59.445               
(103.609)
441.121              
(416.029)
Village Attributes
Has government food program 
0.174         
(0.379)
Has non-government food 
program 
0.181         
(0.385)
Prevailing daily adult wage rate 
(taka) 
26.933       
(6.996)
Key Variables




















Number of observations 629 405 222 1,256
Note: 1 acre equals 100 decimals. 
Source: Own calculation based on 1991/92 household survey in Bangladesh.
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The summary statistics in Table 1 show some striking results. The total average 
hours worked in a month by a 10-15 year-old child both within and outside the household 
in agriculture and non-agriculture sectors are 36.86, which means 9.2 hours per week. 
This figure signifies that poor rural households in Bangladesh rely on child labor for 
subsistence. Interestingly, the mean child labor hours for nontargeted and 
nonparticipating households are 21.69 per month, which are less than that for 
participating households that have the mean child labor hours of 36.62 per month. This is 
consistent with the idea that microfinance programs target poor rural households that 
have very less landholding and no other sources of income. And such households are 
more likely to rely on child labor to suffice the family needs of food and shelter. For 
example, the mean landholdings are 105.32 decimals equivalent to 1.05 acres for 
participating households; whereas the mean landholdings are 441.12 decimals equivalent 
to 4.41 acres for nontargeted and nonparticipating households (Table 1). 
Given the scenario that poor rural women are more disadvantaged than men, one 
would expect microfinance programs not only to target the poor rural women but also to 
be placed in areas with high level of poverty incidence. And in such areas, the local 
governmental bodies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s) launch food programs 
that supply food to poor rural women as an incentive for participating in income-
generating activities. Table 1 shows that these expectations are borne out in the data. For 
example, 17.4 percent of the total surveyed villages have a governmental food program 
and 18.1 percent of the total surveyed villages have a non-governmental food program. 
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20.518               
(68.026)
8.267               
(43.011)




0.548    
(0.497)
0.516                  
(0.5)
0.483                   
(0.501)





12.291               
(1.747)
12.403               
(1.722)




7.147     
(2.481)
6.703                 
(2.426)
7.951                 
(3.345)
7.159         
(2.573)
Number of 0-9 year-old 
members
1.38        
(1.22)
1.227                 
(1.209)
1.279                   
(1.211)
1.345         
(1.219)
Number of 10-15 year-old 
members
1.836    
(0.753)
1.633                 
(0.744)
1.93                   
(0.863)
1.81           
(0.765)
Household head's age in years
47.603  
(10.235)
46.053               
(10.654)
50.553               
(11.587)
47.589       
(10.477)
Male Household head
0.912    
(0.282)
0.874                 
(0.331)
0.849                   
(0.358)





85.882               
(154.591)
220.903              
(517.067)
89.552        
(201.36)
Village Attributes
Has government food program 
0.497              
(0.5)
Has non-government food 
program 
0.087         
(0.283)
Prevailing daily adult wage rate 
(taka) 
51.453       
(13.014)
Key Variables
Women's recent loans (taka)





























Number of observations 1,636 374 186 2,196
Source: Own calculation based on 1998/99 household survey in Bangladesh.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Child Labor and Credit Variables (1991/92 base year currency)











Average hours worked in a month per 
child in a household
36.072               
(68.972)
42.428                   
(74.975)
20.166               
(41.976)
35.338                
(67.445)
Key Variables (household-level 
borrowing)
Women's recent loans (taka)
2,218.95             
(4,142,61) 0 0
1,090.28            
(3,106.40)
Men's recent loans 
1,154.23             
(3,738,91) 0 0
567.13               
(2,681.42)
Women's most recent loans 
4,413.73 
(4,950.87) 0 0
2,168.69            
(4,110.86)
Men's most recent loans 
2,108.8             
(3,841,68) 0 0
1,036.16            
(2,889.97)
Women's past loans 0 0 0 0
Men's past loans 0 0 0 0
Number of observations 284 191 103 578
1998/99
Dependent Variable
Average hours worked in a month per 
child in a household
20.56                
(50.534)
25.157              
(61.7)
12.167              
(43)
20.457              
(54.61)
Key Variables (household-level 
borrowing)
Women's recent loans (taka)
12,989.52             
(19,106.20) 0 0
7,753.261              
(16,071.91)
Men's recent loans 
2,478.261             
(8,893.19) 0 0
1,479.239             
(6,973.676)
Women's most recent loans 
7,503.188      
(11,499.30) 0 0
4,478.547              
(9,612.794)
Men's most recent loans 
1,413.043              
(5,684.25) 0 0
843.4256              
(4,443.479)
Women's past loans 
5,459.95                
(7,702.06) 0 0
3,258.967             
(6,523.209)
Men's past loans 
2,686.08               
(5,979.19) 0 0
1,603.287             
(4,801.372)
Number of observations 345 146 87 578
Note: Average hours worked in a month per child in a household includes hours devoted to both 
within the household and outside the household doing agricultural and non-agricultural work. In 
1991/92, the stock of past loans both for men and women is zero because 1991/92 is the first data point 
in the panel. 
Source: Own calculation based on 1991/92 and 1998/99 household survey in Bangladesh.
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Table 2 presents summary statistics for the 1998/99 household survey in 
Bangladesh, which are comparatively different than those for 1991/92 household 
survey in Bangladesh. The total average hours worked in a month by a 10-15 year-old 
child both within and outside the household in agriculture and non-agriculture sectors are 
16.05. This statistic is less than that for 1991/92 household survey in Bangladesh, which 
shows 36.86 as the total average hours worked in a month by a 10-15 year-old child 
(Table 1). The summary statistics show that the number of governmental food programs 
has increased over the years. Almost 50 percent of the total surveyed villages have a 
governmental food program, which is a marked increase from 17.4 in 1991/92 to 49.7 
percent in 1998/99. However, the non-governmental food programs have decreased from 
18.1 percent in 1991/92 to 8.7 percent in 1998/99. Similarly, the mean prevailing daily 
adult wage rate has increased from 26.33 taka (Tk) to Tk 51.45 in real terms over the 
span of seven years. The loan volumes as well have increased over the years, and the 
increase is more for women than for men (Tables 1 and 2). 
Table 3 displays summary statistics for credit and child labor activities for 
panel households. This research employs a panel data set from household survey 
design in Bangladesh that includes both control and treatment groups. The treatment 
groups are microfinance program participants and the control groups are targeted 
nonparticipants. The nontarget nonparticipating households are also the control 
groups that were excluded from program participation based on land based eligibility 
criteria. The child labor activities for both the control and treatment groups are 
observed over time. In the 1991/92 survey, 49.1 percent of the 578 households were 
microfinance program participants. Microfinance programs have targeted such poor 
rural households in Bangladesh that have landholdings of less than or equal to half an 
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acre of land.12 The eligible nonparticipating and nontarget households were 33 percent 
and 17.8 percent respectively.  In 1998/99 resurvey, 59.68 percent of the 578 
households were program participants. The eligible nonparticipants and nontarget 
households were 25.26 percent and 15.05 percent respectively. Women’s average 
borrowing has increased over the span of 7 years. The average stock of women’s 
recent loans for participating households has increased from 2,218.95 taka (Tk) to Tk 
12,989.52 in real terms. Thus, women have had a considerable increase in borrowing 
than men.
In sum, taken together, the data suggest that microfinance programs in 
Bangladesh have targeted poor women in rural households. The labor supply per 
child in a household has declined from 36.072 mean hours to 20.56 mean hours for 
program participants. The decline in child labor supply is from 35.338 mean hours to 
20.457 mean hours for all households. We now turn to formal regression model in the 
next section. 
12 For details, visit:http://go.worldbank.org/E9WWFZIXJ0
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V:  Results
i. Baseline OLS estimation
I first present the OLS regression estimates of the impact of microcredit upon 
child work using cross-sectional data. The dependent variable is the total average 
hours worked in a month by a 10-15 year-old child. The explanatory variables include 
the amount of loan taken, child attributes, household attributes, and community or 
village-level attributes. As explained above, the amount of microcredit is classified 
under three categories: the stock of recent, most recent, and past loans. Table 4 shows 
the OLS regression estimates for two periods 1991/92 and 1998/99 respectively. In 
both periods, child attributes such as age and gender have positive and statistically 
significant effects upon child labor. For instance, In 1991/92, child labor increases by 
6.8 hours or approximately 18.5 percent in mean hours with age. Household size has 
a negative and statistically significant effect upon child labor. But, child labor is 
positively associated with the number of younger children (0-9 years) in the family. 
This is consistent with what other economists have found in child labor analysis. 
Generally, in a poor rural household, children spend their time in taking care of their 
younger siblings. Child labor is significantly less in the male headed household. For 
instance, in 1998/99, a male-headed household results in the decline in child labor by 
8.43 hours or approximately 51 percent in mean hours. The village attributes such as 
government and nongovernment food programs have a negative and statistically 
significant effects upon child labor (1991/92, Table3). The regression analyses also 
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include the prevailing daily adult wage rate in the village and the square of this 
variable. The statistically significant coefficient estimates on these variables show
that child labor declines with increased adult wage rate. This is consistent with Basu’s 
and Van’s (1998) theoretical argument and Ersados’(2005) empirical analysis that an 
effort toward raising adult’s education and wage level can help reduce the prevalence 
of child labor in poor countries. 
The impact of microfinance loan upon child work is mixed. The 1991/92 
cross-sectional data analysis shows that the stock of women’s most recent loans has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on child labor. A 1 percent increase in the 
stock of women’s most recent loans increases child labor by 0.268 hours. However, 
the 1998/99 data analysis shows that the stock of men’s most recent loans has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on child labor. A 1 percent increase in the 
stock of men’s most recent loans decreases child labor by 0.207 hours. But, the OLS 
regression estimates are likely to suffer from unobserved heterogeneity. As such, in 
order to assess the actual impact of microcredit on child labor, I extend my empirical 
analysis in panel data using household-level fixed effect that controls for time-
invariant unmeasured determinants of child labor. 
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Table 4
OLS Estimates of the Impact of Microfinance Loan upon Child Work
Dependent Variable: (total average hours worked in a month by a child)
1991/92 1998/99
Variables     Coefficients     Robust SE         Coefficients         Robust SE
Constant -71.25 (140.80) -36.75 (170.80)
Child Attributes
Male          36.85*** (3.63)              19.27*** (1.85)
Age          6.799*** (1.19)              5.422*** (0.83)
Household Attributes
Number of members          -3.192** (1.48)               -1.274** (0.59)
Number of 0-9 year-old members          6.248*** (2.31)                  1.924* (1.14)
Number of 10-15 year-old members 3.472 (3.28)              5.506*** (1.71)
Household head's age in years            0.545** (0.24) 0.174 (0.15)
Male Household head          -24.85** (11.13)                 -8.433* (4.74)
Household head's education in years -0.361 (0.31)
Log of household land (decimals) 1.495 (1.37) 0.316 (0.46)
Log of total value of land (taka) -1.257 (0.91) -0.0679 (0.33)
Log of total market price of house (taka) -0.316 (0.24)
Number of non-farm enterprises owned 1.157 (1.73)
Village Attributes
Primary Coeducation School present 2.936 (5.22)
Coeducational High School present -13.34 (10.67)
Post Secondary School present -11.82 (22.44)
Distance to nearest pucca road (km) -0.336 (0.34)
Has government food program             -14.83* (8.17) -1.079 (4.09)
Has non-government food program         -20.07*** (7.44) 4.063 (7.42)
Village electrification 2.534 (5.59)
Prevailing daily adult wage rate (taka)          7.972*** (3.02) 1.386 (0.92)
SQofPrevailing daily adult wage rate           -0.135** (0.06)               -0.0154* (0.01)
Key Variables
Log of women's recent loans (taka) 0.006 (0.21) 0.00224 (0.08)
Log of men's recent loans 0.128 (0.27) 0.000916 (0.08)
Log of women's most recent loans              0.268* (0.15) -0.0503 (0.02)
Log of men's most recent loans -0.0146 (0.18)             -0.207*** (0.07)
Log of women's past loans 0.0845 (0.11)
Log of men's past loans 0.0941 (0.14)
Number of observations 1256 2196
F-statistics (54, 1201) 6.31
F-statistics (60, 2135) 4.74
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * represents significance at 10 percent-level, ** significance 
at 5 percent-level, and *** significance at 1 percent level.
Note: Regressions also include other household attributes such as type of latrines used and log of other 
kinds of assets, other village-level attributes such as infrastructure and price variables to capture the 
effect of time variant changes in local economy. 
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ii. Household-level fixed effect estimation
In this research, I employ a reduced-form child labor equation analyzing the 
impact of microfinance loans on child labor supply.  But before reaching any 
conclusion of the effect of microfinance loans on child labor supply, it is important to 
analyze the effect of microfinance loans on adult labor supply. This is because 
researchers have argued that improved adult labor market conditions in the 
developing world enhance adult employment, thereby reducing child employment. 
For instance, Ersado (2005) argues that increased adult wages and enhanced adult 
education can reduce the prevalence of child labor (Ersado, 2005). Furthermore, 
Charles and Fayed (1998) show that child labor and adult female labor are substitutes 
in production (Charles and Fayed, 1998). Strikingly, using a quasi-experimental 
survey design in rural Bangladesh, Pitt and Khandker (1998) find that microfinance 
loans have a positive and statistically significant effect on female labor supply (Pitt 
and Khandker, 1998). Using the same data set but employing a household fixed-effect 
in panel households, I find a negative and statistically significant effect of 
microfinance loans on child labor supply. This is consistent with Charles’s and 
Fayed’s (1998) argument that child labor and adult female labor are substitutes in 
production. 
I find statistically significant result for the household fixed-effect estimates of 
the impact of microfinance loans on child labor. The results show that women’s stock 
of recent borrowing reduces child labor. Since both the dependent variable (average 
hours worked in a month per child in a household) and the explanatory variable 
(microfinance loan) are in natural logarithms, the credit estimates are the elasticities 
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of child labor supply with respect to credit.13 A 10 percent increase in the stock of 
recent borrowing by women reduces child labor supply by 2.58 percent (Table 5). 
Male borrowing has no statistically significant effect on child labor outcome. 
In their cross-sectional probit analysis, Hazarika and Sarangi (2005) employ 
the interaction terms such as ‘Household access to microcredit × Area owned land in 
acres’ and ‘Household access to microcredit × Number of enterprises owned.’ They 
find statistically significant results for these interaction terms. They explain the 
negative effect of “microcredit access” upon child work as family-labor substitution 
effect and the positive effect of “microcredit access × area of land owned” upon child 
work as household-enterprise capitalization effect. Following Wydick’s (1999) 
theoretical analysis, they argue that the negative impact of microcredit access upon 
child labor can be dampened by household-enterprise capitalization effect (Hazarika 
and Sarangi, 2005). Hence, their findings illustrate that ‘an access to microcredit 
raises the probability of child work in households with average landholdings and 
retail sales enterprises by 0.7 percentage points’ (Hazarika and Sarangi, 2005). 
Following Hazarika and Sarangi (2005), I employ the interaction terms such 
as “log of microfinance loan × log of land owned” and “log of microfinance loan × 
number of enterprises owned,” but I find significant effect of only “log of women’s 
recent stock of loans × log of land owned” on child labor outcome. Interestingly, the 
impact of this interaction term on child labor supply is negative as opposed to positive 
effect in Hazarika and Sarangi’s analysis. As such, there is no household-enterprise 
capitalization effect in my findings. 
13Log-log models are used in regression to correct for heteroskedasticity
26
Thus, a 10 percent increase in the stock of recent borrowing by women with 
landholdings reduces child labor supply by 2.67 percent (Table 5). The results of this 
paper confirm the family labor substitution effect explained in Wydick’s theoretical 
analysis. 
Table 5
Household Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Microfinance Loan upon Child Labor
Dependent Variable: (Log of average hours worked in a month per child)
Variables Coefficient Robust SE
Log of women's recent loans -0.258*** (0.008)
Log of men's recent loans -0.0902 (0.125)
Log of men's most recent loans 0.111 (0.126)
Log of women's most recent loans 0.0161 (0.089)
Log of women's past loans -0.00219 (0.054)
Log of men's past loans 0.081 (0.073)
Log of women's recent loans X Log of household land -0.00259* (0.001)
Log of men's recent loans X Log of household land -0.00299 (0.002)
F-statistics (37, 541) 4.77
Prob>F 0.000
Number of observations 578
F-statistics (H0 : parameter of women's recent stock of loans is equal to 0) 9.21
Prob>F 0.0025
F-statistics (H0 : parameter of 'log of women's recent stock of loans X log 
of land' is equal to 0) 3.52
Prob>F 0.0613
F-statistics (H0 : parameter of men’s and women's recent stock of loans 
are jointly equal to 0) 4.75
Prob>F 0.009
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** represents significance at 1 percent level or better, * 
represents significance at 10 percent level or better.
Note: Regression also includes other variables such as age and sex of the household head, log of total 
land owned (decimals), prevailing adult wage rate in the village, village level infrastructure, and price 
variables to capture the effect of time variant changes in local economy. 
There are many households that report no child labor activities. Since I employ log-log models in panel 
households, I replace zeros with small number. I try different values like 0.01, 0.001, and 0.0001 and 
these make no difference on the level of significance.
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Table 5 presents statistical tests on the effect of program credit on child labor 
supply. The null hypothesis that the stock of women’s recent loans does not have an 
effect on child labor supply is rejected at the 0.05 level. I also test the joint 
significance of men’s and women’s recent stock of loans. The null hypothesis that the 
covariates are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 0.05 level. It is noteworthy that 
men’s borrowing has no statistical significance effect on child labor supply. Such an 
outcome is plausible because microfinance programs have targeted poor women in 
rural households. And while men have lagged behind in program participation, 
women have actively participated in microfinance programs and have increased their 
loan volume over subsequent years (Table 3 and Khandker, 2005). Interestingly, the 
stock of women’s most recent loans14 does not have a statistically significant effect on 
child labor. This may be because an immediate impact of credit either on household 
consumption or on child labor supply is unlikely to happen. Households use 
microfinance loans in income generating activities and such activities only flourish 
with time. 
14In 1998/99 household survey, most recent loans refer to the stock of loans from 1998 to 1999. Also, 
the stock of women’s past credit does not have a statistically significant effect on child labor. This may 
be because in my panel data, the stock of women’s past credit is relatively less compared to the stock 
of women’s recent credit. 
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VI:  Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between child labor and microfinance in 
rural Bangladesh. Researchers and economists have argued that one way to eliminate 
child labor is through the alleviation of poverty in poor and developing nations. In 
order to alleviate poverty, microfinance organizations have been serving the poor and 
women engaged in informal activities through savings and collateral-free group based 
lending. Using household-level fixed effect in panel data for rural Bangladesh, this 
paper shows that the stock of women’s recent loans reduces child labor supply. A 10 
percent increase in the stock of recent borrowing by women reduces child labor 
supply by 2.58 percent (Table 5). An F-test of the null hypothesis that the stock of 
women’s recent loans does not have an effect on child labor supply rejects the null at 
the 0.05 level. This confirms the finding of this paper that women’s borrowing does 
negatively impact the child labor supply. 
Nevertheless, mere intervention of microfinance programs in poor pocketed 
areas of the developing world will not be sufficient to boost child schooling and to 
reduce child labor. In order to work toward eliminating child labor, it is equally 
important to invest in the village-level infrastructure in many remote areas of the 
developing world. An improvement in adult labor market conditions such as 
increased adult wages are necessary to curb child labor. 
Given the success of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the local governmental 
bodies and nongovernmental organizations in developing world have given much 
emphasis on the implementation of microfinance programs. But, success of such 
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programs have also been measured based on high repayment rates rather than focused
on borrower’s welfare level. This paper subtly explores the econometric issues related 
to program impact analysis and shows that women’s borrowing does negatively 
impact the child labor supply. Hence, governments in developing economies should 
focus microfinance as one of the mechanisms to eliminate child labor.
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